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Abstract
Several arguments have been proposed some years ago, attempt-
ing to prove the impossibility of defining Lorentz-invariant elements
of reality. I find that a sufficient condition for the existence of ele-
ments of reality, introduced in these proofs, seems to be used also as
a necessary condition. I argue that Lorentz-invariant elements of re-
ality can be defined but, as Vaidman pointed out, they won’t satisfy
the so-called product rule. In so doing I obtain algebraic constraints
on elements of reality associated with a maximal set of commuting
Hermitian operators.
1 Introduction
The notion of “element of reality” was introduced in the famous Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paper [1], as an attribute of a physical quan-
tity whose value can be predicted with certainty without disturbing the sys-
tem. Criticizing the EPR conclusion that quantum mechanics is incomplete,
Bohr [2] argued that the phrase “without in any way disturbing a system”
is ambiguous and emphasized the necessity of taking into account the exper-
imental arrangement with which a physical quantity is measured. To avoid
the ambiguity, Redhead [3] gave the following sufficient condition for the
existence of an element of reality, hereafter called ER1:
If we can predict with certainty, or at any rate with probability
one, the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, then
at the time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to
1
the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted
measurement result. [ER1]
A number of interpretations of quantum mechanics involving various
kinds of elements of reality were proposed after the EPR paper, in particular
Bohmian mechanics [4] and modal interpretations [5]. These were originally
developed as nonrelativistic theories, and it has been notoriously difficult to
reconcile them with the special theory of relativity. Eventually, the question
was raised whether Lorentz-invariant elements of reality are inconsistent with
quantum mechanics [6, 7, 8].
The purpose of this paper is to revisit that question, and bring a number
of additional considerations to it. I will first analyze in detail Hardy’s ar-
gument, which was meant to show that Lorentz-invariant elements of reality
are indeed inconsistent with quantum mechanics.1 I will argue that this and
related arguments use ER1 not only as a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an element of reality, but also, it seems, as a necessary condition.
A contradiction then immediately follows, quite independently from details
of quantum mechanics. My argument will make use of constraints, derived
in the appendix, on elements of reality associated with a maximal set of
commuting Hermitian operators. I will then investigate to what extent the
light cone associated with an event can be used to define Lorentz-invariant
elements of reality. It turns out to be possible, but these elements of reality
won’t satisfy the so-called product rule, i.e. an element of reality associated
with a product of two commuting operators will not always be equal to the
product of elements of reality associated with each operator [9, 10]. Building
on this I will discuss a number of analyses of Hardy’s and related arguments
published in the literature.
2 Hardy’s argument
Hardy’s gedanken experiment [6] is illustrated in Fig. 1. Two Mach-Zehnder-
type interferometers are set up, one for electrons (MZ−, lower right) and one
for positrons (MZ+, upper left). Electrons (positrons) are emitted with initial
1Hardy’s paper also provides a very interesting proof of Bell’s theorem that does not
make use of inequalities. That part of the paper will not be discussed here.
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wave function s− (s+). Two beam splitters BS1± act in such a way that
|s±〉 → 1√
2
(i|u±〉+ |v±〉). (1)
The overlap of the two interferometers allows paths u− and u+ to meet at
point P . In that case the electron and positron annihilate, i.e.
|u+〉|u−〉 → |γ〉. (2)
- -
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Figure 1: Hardy’s thought experiment with two Mach-Zehnder-type interfer-
ometers
Let the initial state of the system be |s+〉|s−〉. Using (1) and (2), we
find that beyond beam splitters BS1± and beyond point P , the state of the
system has been transformed into
1
2
(− γ + i|u+〉|v−〉+ i|v+〉|u−〉+ |v+〉|v−〉). (3)
In each interferometer, the two paths are reflected by mirrors arranged
so that the paths eventually meet again. At the meeting points are two
additional beam splitters BS2− and BS2+ that act on the incoming beams
3
so that2
|u±〉 → 1√
2
(|c±〉+ i|d±〉) and |v±〉 → 1√
2
(i|c±〉+ |d±〉). (4)
Let F be the rest frame of the two interferometers. We assume that in F ,
the electron and positron in each run of the experiment reach BS2− and BS2+
simultaneously. Just before this then, the state of the system is given by (3).
We now consider two additional Lorentz frames F− and F+, moving with
respect to F with opposite velocities. These velocities are chosen so that in
F−, the electron arrives at BS2− much before the positron arrives at BS2+,
whereas in F+, the positron arrives much before the electron. Consider a
time in F− when the electron has gone through BS2−, but the positron has
not yet reached BS2+. Using (3) and (4), we find that the state of the system
is then given by
1
2
√
2
(−
√
2γ − |u+〉|c−〉+ 2i|v+〉|c−〉+ i|u+〉|d−〉). (5)
Similarly, at a time in F+ when the positron has gone through BS2+ but the
electron has not yet reached BS2−, the state of the system is given by
1
2
√
2
(−
√
2γ − |c+〉|u−〉+ 2i|c+〉|v−〉+ i|d+〉|u−〉). (6)
Finally, we note that when both the electron and positron have gone through
the second beam splitters, the state of the system is given by
1
4
(− 2γ − 3|c+〉|c−〉+ i|c+〉|d−〉+ i|d+〉|c−〉 − |d+〉|d−〉). (7)
To argue against relativistic elements of reality, Hardy proposes a suffi-
cient condition for their existence and a necessary condition for their Lorentz
invariance. The sufficient condition for the existence of an element of real-
ity essentially coincides with Redhead’s ER1. The necessary condition for
Lorentz invariance of elements of reality, hereafter called LI1, simply reads
as:
The value of an element of reality corresponding to a Lorentz-
invariant observable is itself Lorentz invariant. [LI1]
2In Ref. [6], beam splitters BS2− and BS2+ are removable, but we don’t need this
flexibility here.
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I shall denote an element of reality associated with an observable A by f(A).
Whenever ER1 is satisfied for A, then f(A) coincides with an eigenvalue of
A, a real number.
Hardy introduces two observables U± defined as
U± = |u±〉〈u±|. (8)
He then points out that
1. in state |u+〉, f(U+) = 1;
2. in state |u−〉, f(U−) = 1;
3. in state |u+〉|u−〉, f(U+U−) = 1;
4. in any state |u+, u−〉⊥ orthogonal to |u+〉|u−〉, f(U+U−) = 0.
From ER1 he concludes that
f(U+)f(U−) = 1⇒ f(U+U−) = 1. (9)
We can now state Hardy’s argument against Lorentz-invariant elements
of reality. Consider a situation where, in frame F+, a positron is detected
in D+ before the electron reaches BS2−. Then the system’s state (6) is pro-
jected onto its last term, and the electron’s state becomes |u−〉. In this case
f(U−) = 1 in F+ and, by LI1 and since U− is Lorentz invariant, f(U−) = 1
in all Lorentz frames. Similarly, consider a situation where, in frame F−,
an electron is detected in D− before the positron reaches BS2+. Then the
system’s state (5) is projected onto its last term, the positron’s state becomes
|u+〉 and f(U+) = 1 in all Lorentz frames. According to (7), both these situa-
tions will occur together, on average, in one of every sixteen runs. Whenever
they occur together, in all frames before detection we have f(U−) = 1 and
f(U+) = 1, whence by (9), f(U+U−) = 1. But according to (3) the state in
F , the rest frame of the two interferometers, is orthogonal to |u+〉|u−〉. Hence
f(U+U−) = 0, which establishes the contradiction and shows that Lorentz-
invariant elements of reality are incompatible with quantum mechanics.
3 Analysis of the argument
In formulating his argument, Hardy made explicit use of the projection pos-
tulate. One can see, however, that this amounts to little more than a verbal
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simplification, and that the use of the postulate is in no way necessary to
reach the intended conclusion. Indeed consider the steps leading to the con-
clusion that f(U−) = 1 in F+. From (6), one easily sees that the probability
of obtaining the result 1 upon measuring U−, conditional on obtaining the
result 1 upon measuring D+, is given by
P (U− → 1|D+ → 1) = P (U
− → 1 and D+ → 1)
P (D+ → 1) =
|i/(2√2)|2
|i/(2√2)|2 = 1. (10)
This means that if we obtain 1 upon measuring D+, we can predict with
certainty that we will obtain 1 upon measuring U−. By ER1 then, and
without any appeal to the projection postulate, f(U−) = 1.
Let us now focus on condition ER1. Just like Redhead, Hardy intends it
as a sufficient condition for the existence of an element of reality. I will now
argue that it is actually used in a much stronger way. To see this, consider
the following steps of a possible proof of (9):
1. Assume that f(U+)f(U−) = 1. Since f(U±) is either 1 or 0, we must
have both f(U+) = 1 and f(U−) = 1.
2. Since there is an element of reality corresponding to U+ having value 1,
we can predict with certainty that measuring U+ will yield value 1.
Therefore the system’s state |Φ〉 is an eigenstate of U+ with eigen-
value 1. Similarly, |Φ〉 is an eigenstate of U− with eigenvalue 1.
3. Since |Φ〉 is an eigenstate of U+ and U− with eigenvalue 1 in each case,
it is also an eigenstate of U+U− with eigenvalue 1.
4. Since |Φ〉 is an eigenstate of U+U− with eigenvalue 1, we can pre-
dict with certainty that measuring U+U− will yield value 1. Hence
f(U+U−) = 1.
Looking closely at step 2, one can see that it assumes that ER1 is not only
a sufficient, but also a necessary condition. Admittedly, steps 1–4 represent
one possible reconstruction of the proof of (9), and we cannot rule out other
reconstructions that would use weaker conditions. But no proof of (9) is
provided in Ref. [6] assuming ER1 as a sufficient condition only.
That ER1 is in fact used as a necessary condition gains additional support
from the assumption that the elements of reality obey the so-called product
rule, i.e.
f(U+U−) = f(U+)f(U−). (11)
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I show in the appendix that any real-valued function f which (i) is defined on
a maximal set of commuting Hermitian operators, (ii) satisfies the product
rule, and (iii) is 1 on some but not all unit projectors in the set, singles out a
one-dimensional subspace of the state space, i.e. there is only one projector
in the set on which f = 1. If the element of reality that this function assigns
is identified with an eigenvalue of a quantum observable, then a unique state
vector is singled out by the specification that f = 1. Hence it leads to the
most definite predictions that quantum mechanics allows.
One should note that the same analysis applies to the proofs given in
Ref. [7] and [8]. In [7], an inference similar to (9) is used at the bottom of
the second column of p. 181. In [8], the authors consider separately the cases
where QM is or is not complete. In the former (p. 124), elements of reality
are taken to be eigenvalues, which necessarily satisfy the product rule. In
the latter (p. 125), the product rule is explicitly assumed.
On reading Hardy’s and related arguments, one may be tempted to ques-
tion the appropriateness of conjoining a manifestly non-Lorentz-invariant
sufficient condition for the existence of elements of reality (ER1) with a re-
quirement of Lorentz invariance of some elements of reality (LI1). Assuming
that ER1 is used not only as a sufficient but also as a necessary condition,
the contradiction follows in a strikingly simple way: (a) For the experiment
under consideration, the premise of ER1, as this condition is formulated, is
true in some frames and not in others. (b) LI1 says that if the consequent of
ER1 holds in one frame, then (for Lorentz-invariant observables) it holds in
all frames. (c) But ER1 is also a necessary condition; therefore its premise
must hold in all frames. We see that (c) plainly contradicts (a).
4 Lorentz-invariant elements
Condition ER1 involves the word “predict” in an essential way. In the tech-
nical context in which it is used here, just like in its normal usage, “predict”
refers to the future. The premise of ER1 assumes that we know the (relevant)
world configuration shortly before t in one Lorentz frame, and can infer from
this the result of measuring the physical quantity A at time t.
Because ER1 refers to a specific Lorentz frame, it is clearly not a rela-
tivistically invariant criterion. Indeed in the Hardy setup, a prediction in
frame F+ can become a retrodiction in F−, and vice versa. So how can we
get an invariant criterion? The answer is that, instead of specifying a hy-
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persurface in a noninvariant way (i.e. at constant time), we should use an
invariant specification. The way to do this is to make use of the light cone
whose apex coincides with the measurement event.3 The light cone, however,
can be used in a number of different ways, which will have to be investigated
more closely.
Suppose we use the backward light cone of the measurement event. A
sufficient criterion for the existence of an element of reality could then be the
following:
If from the (relevant) information on or inside the backward light
cone of a possible measurement event E , we can infer with cer-
tainty, or at any rate with probability one, the result of measuring
a physical quantity at E , then at that event there exists an ele-
ment of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having
a value equal to the predicted measurement result. [ER2]
Formulated in this way, ER2 is a perfectly valid and relativistically in-
variant criterion. It is, however, completely inadequate as a specification
of elements of reality in the sense of EPR. Indeed ER2 can only serve to
specify elements of reality in the absolute future of the agent making the
inference. But EPR had in mind elements of reality whose values could, in
some circumstances at least, be inferred at events spacelike separated from
the agent.
So instead of using the backward light cone, we should make use of the
forward one. Here then is an appropriate sufficient criterion for the existence
of an element of reality:
If from the (relevant) information on or outside the forward light
cone of a possible measurement event E , we can infer with cer-
tainty, or at any rate with probability one, the result of measuring
a physical quantity at E , then at that event there exists an ele-
ment of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having
a value equal to the predicted measurement result. [ER3]
We should note that the word “infer” here can cover both prediction and
retrodiction. In ER2, it covers only prediction. Readers who are familiar with
the Hellwig-Kraus theory of state vector collapse [11] will probably see the
3Of course a measurement does not occur at a specific space-time point, but I will
assume that the argument can be adapted to a more realistic situation.
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analogy between that theory and ER3. In the Hellwig-Kraus approach, the
collapse of the state vector occurs on the past light cone of the measurement
event (sayM), instead of on an equal time hypersurface. Such a collapse can
therefore be relevant to the attribution of an element of reality to a physical
quantity at an event E that is spacelike separated from (and in the relative
past of) the collapse triggering event M. I shall come back to the Hellwig-
Kraus approach in Sec. 5, and argue that it stands in spite of objections
made to it in the literature.
But we are not yet over. ER3 is a suitable condition for the existence
of an element of reality pertaining to a local physical quantity. We still
have to adapt it to nonlocal quantities, like U+U− in Hardy’s setup. There
are several obvious invariant ways to combine two light cones, through their
union and their intersection. These operations are illustrated in Fig. 2, for
one space and one time dimension. We shall denote by U the union of the
regions outside the forward light cones of the boxes associated with U+ and
U−. Specifically, U contains regions 1, 3 and 4 in Fig. 2. Likewise we shall
denote by I the intersection of the regions outside the forward light cones of
the boxes. I coincides with region 4 in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Combination of two light cones
Suppose that we try to adapt criterion ER3 to U . It is clear that any
time an actual measurement of U+U− is performed, its result can be deduced
from information available in U , for this region includes part of the absolute
future of the measurement events. Hence the criterion is in this case trivial.
I shall come back in Sec. 5 to the case where, as in Hardy’s argument, no
actual measurement of U+U− is performed.
Suppose next that we try to adapt criterion ER3 to I. Let us see what
we can say about elements of reality pertaining to the physical quantities
9
U+, U− and U+U− in a run where detection occurs at D+ and D−. Since
D− is outside the forward light cone of U+, ER3 implies that f(U+) = 1.
Likewise since D+ is outside the forward light cone of U−, ER3 implies that
f(U−) = 1. This holds in all Lorentz frames.
It turns out, however, that neither D+ nor D− are in I, the intersection
of the regions outside the two forward light cones. Hence ER3 cannot be
used to deduce the existence of an element of reality associated with U+U−,
nor a fortiori to attribute a value to f(U+U−). Hardy’s argument therefore
no longer goes through.
Thus if we pick I (i.e. region 4) as the relevant region for inferring ele-
ments of reality like f(U+U−), we have f(U+) = 1 = f(U−) but the value of
f(U+U−) cannot be inferred. It therefore follows that the product rule (11)
no longer necessarily holds. This is the price we have to pay for this notion
of relativistically invariant elements of reality.
5 Discussion
Hardy’s and related arguments were criticized by various authors, from sev-
eral different angles. I will here review these criticisms in the light of the
present analysis.
In a detailed analysis of Hardy’s argument, Clifton and Niemann [7] sug-
gested that the Lorentz-invariance criterion LI1 is too strong. They proposed
instead the following:
If an element-of-reality corresponding to some Lorentz invariant
physical quantity exists and has a value within a spacetime region
R with respect to one spacelike hyperplane containing R then, if
it exists with respect to another hyperplane H containing R, it has
the same value in R with respect to H. [LI2]
Using LI2 instead of LI1, one easily sees that Hardy’s argument no longer goes
through. If, however, the objective is to have a Lorentz-invariant theory at
the level of elements of reality, then LI2 will not meet it. For LI2 suggests that
we will have elements of reality corresponding to Lorentz-invariant physical
quantities that will exist in some Lorentz frames and not in others.
Another criticism of the argument, made in Refs. [7] and [12], is that ele-
ments of reality are defined without sufficiently taking context into account.4
4Replying to [12], Hardy [13] conceded that if one does not assume locality, his argument
10
It is well known that in theories involving hidden variables, their values de-
pend on context, for instance on what specific observable is being measured
far away. In Hardy’s setup, one can measure different observables related
to the positron and the electron, by removing the mirrors BS2+ and BS2−.
However, Cohen and Hiley [14] pointed out that to carry out the argument,
Hardy only uses a single experimental context, the one where both mirrors
are in place and both detectors D+ and D− fire. Thus context dependence
construed as above is not relevant to the analysis. On the other hand, the
criterion ER3 for the existence of elements of reality, and its generalization
to nonlocal observables through the region I introduced in Sec. 4, do in a
quite specific sense involve context. Indeed the “relevant information” is
not the same for the local observable U+ as it is for the nonlocal observable
U+U−. The expression “context dependence” may therefore remain more
appropriate than the expression “observer specific” suggested in [14].
Cohen and Hiley have also argued that the use of the projection postulate
is the crux of the problem. In Sec. 3, however, we showed that although
Hardy formulated his argument in the language of the projection postulate,
it doesn’t really depend on it. By using a functional-based formalism for the
description of the state of a quantum-mechanical system, Cohen and Hiley
can provide a relativistically-covariant description of whatever collapses occur
in the Hardy experiment. That formalism, however, doesn’t seem to allow
for elements of reality to be introduced even when measurement results can
be predicted with certainty.5
Vaidman [9, 10] has argued that insistence on the validity of the product
rule (11), on which Hardy’s and other arguments are based, is what prevents
defining Lorentz-invariant elements of reality. To show this, Vaidman applied
the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule to the setup. In its original
formulation [17], the rule gives the probability Prob(Pi → 1|φ, ψ) that, if a
system is prepared in a state |φ〉 and found in a final stage to be in a state
|ψ〉, an intermediate measurement associated with a projector Pi will find
doesn’t hold. In so doing he seems to have viewed condition ER1 differently.
5Dewdney and Horton [15] have introduced Lorentz-invariant elements of reality as-
sociated with Bohmian trajectories, but their approach appears to involve significant
constraints on the particles’ motion. A Lorentz-invariant realistic approach to quantum
mechanics was also proposed by Tumulka [16] in the context of the Ghirardi-Rimini-
Weber model of spontaneous collapse, again with restrictions on the particles’ interaction.
Ref. [16] also provides a brief overview of the literature on relativistic models explaining
quantum-mechanical probabilities.
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the result 1:
Prob(Pi → 1|φ, ψ) = Tr(PψPiPφPi)∑
j Tr(PψPjPφPj)
. (12)
Here Pφ and Pψ project on states |φ〉 and |ψ〉. The sum in the denominator
runs on a set of orthogonal projectors summing to the identity.6
Vaidman then shows that if |φ〉 is the state given in (3) and |ψ〉 = |d+〉d−〉
(i.e. the state obtained upon detection by D+ and D−), then there is unit
probability for the following three intermediate results: (i) U+ yields 1; (ii)
U− yields 1; and (iii) U+U− yields 0.
These probabilities are unobjectionable if the intermediate measurements
are carried out. But in Hardy’s experiment, they are not. However, Vaid-
man extrapolates the ABL rule to counterfactual situations. He proposes
to attribute elements of reality to physical quantities whose values can be
deduced with certainty, on the basis of a counterfactual use of the ABL rule.
From the results given above, it is clear that these elements of reality do not
satisfy the product rule.
Can functions defined on commuting Hermitian operators and not satis-
fying the product rule still be called elements of reality? This is a semantical
question that I shall not address, but there is no doubt that, if anything,
they make for a peculiar kind of reality. Cohen and Hiley [18] have argued
that the violation of the product rule entails a meaning of true which “differs
from its meaning in standard predictive quantum mechanics and in all other
branches of physics.” But the difference may not be so drastic. A proposition
p and its negation may both be true if they refer to different times, i.e. to
different contexts. As we have seen above, elements of reality are in some
sense context dependent. Note that an operational, albeit indirect, meaning
to the violation of the product rule can in the present situation be provided
by weak measurements [19].
Cohen and Hiley also objected to Vaidman’s counterfactual use of the
ABL rule, on the grounds that the observables involved do not form the basis
of a consistent family of histories. It would seem, however, that this lack of
a consistent family only prevents assigning to elements of reality values that
can be revealed in and would be unaffected by an eventual measurement.
Much of the debate on the counterfactual use of the ABL rule comes from
6If the system’s Hamiltonian doesn’t vanish between measurements, |φ〉must be evolved
forwards to the time of the intermediate measurement and |ψ〉 must similarly be evolved
backwards.
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the failure to realize that a number of different assertions can be made about
counterfactual measurement results that are all consistent with the formalism
of quantum mechanics. I have argued elsewhere [20] that the counterfactual
use of the ABL rule, in situations where it is allowed, is not a consequence
of the formalism of quantum mechanics, but is part of its interpretation.
I should point out that Vaidman’s analysis corresponds to the choice
indicated in Sec. 4, where the value of the element of reality corresponding
to the nonlocal observable U+U− could be deduced from information in the
union U of the regions outside the two forward light cones of the events. As
he claims, it thus provides Lorentz-invariant elements of reality.
In closing this section, I would like to argue for the consistency of the
Hellwig-Kraus relativistic theory of the projection postulate, against the crit-
icism made to it by Aharonov and Albert [21].
Briefly, Aharonov and Albert correctly pointed out that some nonlocal
observables can be measured by means of local measurements only. To illus-
trate this, they considered two spin 1/2 particles prepared in the singlet state
and then separated at an arbitrarily large distance. Next they introduced
two measurement apparatus, correlated in such a way that the difference of
their (three-dimensional) positions and the sum of their momenta are well
defined. They then showed that these apparatus can be used, say at t = −ǫ
in some frame, to assert that each component of the two particles’ total spin
vanishes, in a non-demolition way.
Now suppose that at time t in that frame, the z-component of the spin
of the left particle is measured. According to the Hellwig-Kraus theory, that
particle’s state then collapses onto |+; zˆ〉 or |−; zˆ〉 along the backward light
cone of the particle. This, Aharonov and Albert maintain, contradicts the
fact that the two-particle state is |S = 0〉 just before the measurement (at
t = −ǫ).
According to the Hellwig-Kraus theory, however, the local non-demolition
measurements at t = −ǫ will not collapse the nonlocal state on this equal-
time hypersurface (that would not be relativistically invariant), but on the
union of the two particles’ backward light cones. Hence the two-particle state
|S = 0〉 will be valid in the region bounded by these light cones and the one
coming from the measurement event of the z-spin of the left particle.
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6 Conclusion
Hardy’s and other proofs of the nonexistence of Lorentz-invariant elements
of reality rely in one way or another on the assumption that the element of
reality associated with a product of commuting Hermitian operators is the
product of the elements of reality associated with each individual operator.
This assumption, as shown in the appendix, constrains values of elements of
reality defined on a maximal set of commuting Hermitian operators. Once
it is removed, Lorentz-invariant elements of reality can be defined using var-
ious combinations of the light cones associated with measurement events.
This construction, although not necessarily involving state vector collapse,
is reminiscent of the Hellwig-Kraus theory. The kind of context dependence
involved allows for the failure of the product rule and clarifies the sense in
which these elements of reality differ from what this concept usually covers.
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Appendix
In this section I address the question of finding real-valued functions, on
a maximal set of commuting Hermitian operators, that satisfy the product
rule.
Let V be a complex vector space of finite dimension N > 2, and let {|ui〉}
be an orthonormal basis in V. Then the set of all operators of the form
H =
N∑
i=1
λi|ui〉〈ui|, (13)
with the λi real, is a maximal set of commuting Hermitian operators. We
look for real functions f(H) such that the product rule is satisfied, i.e.
f(Ha)f(Hb) = f(HaHb) (14)
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for any Ha and Hb having the form (13).
For any projector P , (14) implies that f(P ) = f(PP ) = f(P )f(P ), so
that f(P ) = 0 or 1. Let Pi denote the one-dimensional projector |ui〉〈ui|. All
possible cases then fall into the following three disjoint collections:
1. f(Pi) = 1 for all Pi.
2. f(Pi) = 1 for some Pi and 0 for others.
3. f(Pi) = 0 for all Pi.
Let us now examine these possibilities in more detail.
Case 1 Let K = Pi + λjPj with i 6= j and λj 6= 0. Then
f(K) = f(K)f(Pi) = f(KPi) = f(Pi) = 1 (15)
and
f(K) = f(K)f(Pj) = f(KPj) = f(λjPj), (16)
whence f(λjPj) = 1 for all j and λj 6= 0. For any nontrivial H as given
in (13), there is a k such that λk 6= 0. But then
f(H) = f(H)f(Pk) = f(HPk) = f(λkPk) = 1. (17)
Note that since PiPj = 0 we also have f(0) = 1, hence f(H) = 1 for all H .
Case 2 Here there has to be exactly one Pi such that f(Pi) = 1. For if
f(Pi) = 1 = f(Pj) with i 6= j, then
f(0) = f(PiPj) = f(Pi)f(Pj) = 1. (18)
But if k is such that f(Pk) = 0,
f(0) = f(PiPk) = f(Pi)f(Pk) = 0, (19)
which contradicts (18).
Now let H be as in (13). Then
f(H) = f(H)f(Pi) = f(HPi) = f(λiPi). (20)
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Moreover
f(λiPi)f(λ
′
iPi) = f(λiλ
′
iPi). (21)
Restricted to positive values of λi, (21) means that f is a one-dimensional
representation of the Lie group of products of real numbers. In the expo-
nential parametrization λ = exp(lnλ), hence representations have the form
f(λiPi) = exp(α lnλi) = (λi)
α, where α must be real for f to be. To extend
f to negative values of λi we can either put f(−|λi|Pi) = |λi|α for all λi or
f(−|λi|Pi) = −|λi|α for all λi. Finally, for f to remain finite as λi → 0, the
exponent α must be nonnegative. This also follows from (19) if f is required
to be continuous. It then follows from (20) that for all H
f(H) = |λi|α (22)
or
f(H) =
{
(λi)
α if λi ≥ 0,
−|λi|α if λi < 0.
(23)
Case 3 We see at once that f(0) = 0. It may be that there is a two-
dimensional projector Pij = Pi + Pj such that f(Pij) = 1. Then for any
projector which is a sum of one or several Pk orthogonal to Pij ,
f(P ) = f(Pij)f(P ) = f(PijP ) = f(0) = 0 (24)
and
f(P + Pi) = f(P + Pi)f(Pij) = f [(P + Pi)Pij] = f(Pi) = 0. (25)
Likewise we easily see that f(P + Pj) = 0 and f(P + Pij) = 1. If we let
f(H) = |λi|α|λj|β for α > 0 and β > 0, we find at once that (14) is satisfied
for all Ha and Hb. It can also be satisfied with various choices similar to
(23).
If there is no two-dimensional projector Pij such that f(Pij) = 1 (and
therefore f(Pij) = 0 for all i and j), it may be that there is a three-
dimensional projector Pijk = Pi + Pj + Pk such that f(Pijk) = 1. Letting
f(H) = |λi|α|λj|β|λk|γ (with α > 0, β > 0 and γ > 0), we see that (14) is
satisfied for all Ha and Hb. The same argument goes on in higher dimensions.
It is tempting to conjecture that this exhausts all possibilities, but I do not
have a proof of this general statement.
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